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IVASHINGTON CASE LAW-1955

EVIDENCE
Best Evidence Rule-Tape Recording Competent Evidence
Where Made From Original Wire Recording. In a recent case' the
Washington Supreme Court has held, for the first time apparently,
that it is not error to overrule an objection of "not the best evidence"
where a tape recording was offered into evidence at a time when the
inaudible' wire recording from which it had been transcribed was
already an exhibit. The court made an analogy to the factual situation
of the introduction of a photographic positive print and the usual ruling
that the negative need not be produced.
For the purpose of this note the opinions discussing the application
of the "best evidence rule," where writings are not involved, may
be segregated into three problem areas-the first represented by the
principal case. It should be pointed out that here the "original"
evidence was already an exhibit, so the introduction of the transcription was primarily for convenience. Because of these facts, this is a
rather unusual situation for an application of the best evidence rule.
It would seem that there really was no necessity for the analogy made
by the court which goes further than the facts of the case do.
As Wigmore has pointed out, the best evidence rule generally applies
only to writings,' and so in factual situations representing the second
problem area, accurate reproductions of objects not writings should
be admissible without accounting for the original where it is unavailable. The reasoning behind such a result seems to be that where it
appears that secondary evidence is clearly equal in probative value
to primary proof and that fraud or imposition is not to be reasonably
feared, the reason on which the best evidence rule rests ceases, and the
rule itself becomes inapplicable.4 Factually, the closest Washington
case to the principal decision is State v. Witzell,' where it was held
that photographs of fingerprints found on a safe could be introduced
over objections that the safe itself should be introduced. The court
said that objections to the photographs go to the weight and not to
the competency of their use as evidence.
A third problem area is that of applying the best evidence rule
I State v. Lyskoski, 147 Wash. Dec. 89, 287 P.2d 114.

'Actually, the wire recording could have been made audible to the members of the
jury had they been furnished with earphones.
3 WiG0RE ON EVmECE, Vol. 3, § 796.
4 United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1938), Spector v. United States,
107 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 664, 60 S.Ct. 590, 84 L. Ed.
1012 (1939).
5175 Wash. 146, 26 P.2d 1049 (1933).
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to inscribed chattels. The general policy here seems to be that the
trial court is allowed a broad discretion in questions of whether secondary evidence concerning an inscribed chattel is to be admissible as
opposed to a requirement of introduction of the inscribed chattel
itself.' It has been suggested by at least one text writer than the trial
court also be given this broad discretion in factual situations illustrating
the second problem area, e.g., where a party seeks to introduce a
subsequent recording where the original recording has been lost or
destroyed.' One court has held directly contrary to such a suggestion.'
It would seem that an analogy might well be made from the rules
applied in the case of an inscribed chattel, to the situation in the
Lyskoski case.
The Lyskoski case indicates an extension by the Washington court
of the rule regarding photographs to the situation of original and transcribed recordings. However, as pointed out above, this indicated
extension does not constitute a holding on the facts present in the
case. Though this is true, the result reached by the court is altogether
reasonable. It is suggested however, that the two tests set out in
the cases of problem area two be met before such a result is reached.
That is:
1. It should appear that the "secondary" evidence is clearly equal
in probative value to the primary proof, and
2. It should appear that fraud or imposition is not to be reasonably
feared.
GoRDON L. WALGREN

INSURANCE
Insurance-Effect of a Divorce Decree. In United Benefit Life
Insurance Co. v. Price' the Washington court kept alive one more
aspect of the unfortunate doctrine handed down originally in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Powers.' The facts in the case were these:'
6See, e.g., State v. Lewark, 106 Kan. 184, 186 Pac. 1002 (1920) ; Mattson v. Minn.
& N.W.
R. Co., 98 Minn. 296, 108 N.W. 517 (1906).
7
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,

p. 412, n.5 (1954 ed.).

8 People v. King, 101 Cal. App. 2d 500, 225 P.2d 950 (1950).
case in 64 HARv.L. REV. 1369.

See criticism of this

146 Wn.2d 587,283 P.2d 119 (1955).

2 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937). The errors inherent in this doctrine have not
gone unnoticed by members of the Washington court. In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v.
Brock, 41 Wn.2d 369, 249 P.2d 383 (1952), an eight man court was evenly divided on
the question of overruling it completely. See also the dissenting opinion of Mallery, J.,
in Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn.2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947).

